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Following the contraction in demand for law firms' services during the Great
Recession, "Big Law" was widely diagnosed as suffering from several maladies that would
spell its ultimate demise, including excessive fees, excessive size, increased competition
from in-house counsel, the commoditization of legal work, and the decline in demand for
"relationship firms. " While each of these market pressures is only too real for certain
segments of the law-firm population, their threat to the most elite U.S. law firms has been
largely misunderstood. Even as many firms reduce their fees and contract in size, we
should expect certain firms to continue to charge more and grow bigger. The current
prescriptions for fixing Big Law fail to recognize that the top-tier firms within the group
serve a unique market function.
Focusing on a particular type of legal work-major corporate transactions-this
Article proposes a novel theory of the value created by elite law firms: their private
information about "market" deal terms, acquired through repeated exposure to the same
types of transactions, provides clients with a significant bargaining advantage in deal
negotiations. By aggregating expertise in the ever-changing and ever-increasing set of deal
terms for certain transactions, law firms help their clients price such terms more accurately
and thereby maximize their surplus from the deal. This pricing function-traditionally
thought to be limited to investment banks-is one that cannot be replicated or subsumed
by in-house counsel, other service providers, or commoditized contracts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the age of increasingly sophisticated in-house counsel, what exactly are the benefits
that law firms provide to their clients? Among law firms, what does the relative ranking or
prestige of a law firm actually reflect? Although these questions are of enormous and
urgent practical interest, the scholarship addressing them remains surprisingly limited. We
can begin our inquiry with a puzzle. Discussions of the legal profession today devote much
attention to the need for "Big Law" to provide more cost-effective services to their clients. 1
The still-recent financial crisis and continuing sluggish economic growth in the United
States have only rendered these calls for reform more urgent. Because law firms fail to
provide sufficient value in return for their fees, the argument goes, demand for their
services has slackened, resulting in painful layoffs for experienced lawyers and a dismal
job market for recent law school graduates. 2
Yet this dire picture ignores a surprising-and, perhaps, dismaying-reality: it is
precisely those law firms that charged the highest fees before the downturn for whom
demand continues to be greatest and who are best weathering the crisis in the legal
profession. 3 While many lower-ranked law firms continue to struggle, the highest-ranked
firms present a picture of financial health and perennially overworked lawyers. 4 There is a
widening chasm between the most elite corporate law firms and the rest of the pack in
terms of transaction volume, billing rates, lawyer compensation, and hiring.5
1. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death ofBig Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749,749 (2010) (discussing "the forces
driving the downsizing of Big Law" and suggesting alternative viable business models for legal services);
RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 1-3 (2008)
(predicting a diminished role for lawyers as a result of cost pressures and technological innovation); see also
William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 38 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 14 (2013) (agreeing that "the
Big Law model is, in fact, dead" and predicting a new era of "Lean Law"); Antone Johnson, Why Are Lawyers
So Expensive Even With The Excess Of Supply Of Lawyers?, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/quora/2012/03/06/why-are-lawyers-so-expensive-even-with-the-excess-suppy-of-lawyers/ (arguing
that large law firms should decrease their billing rates in response to decreased demand for lawyers).
2. See Elizabeth Olson, Corporations Drive Drop in Law Firms' Use of Starting Lawyers, Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/1 0/corporations-drive-drop-in-law-
firms-use-of-starting-lawyers-study-finds/? --r=0 (describing companies' increasing reluctance to pay for the
services of untrained associates at law firms).
3. See Bernard Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law
Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) (disagreeing with Ribstein's prediction of the
"death of Big Law" and arguing instead that the "recession['s] ... economic forces... do not threaten the viability
of the large law firm as such"); Daniel Currell & M. Todd Henderson, Can Lawyers Stay in the Driver's Seat?,
38 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 17, 19 (2014) (critiquing Ribstein and arguing that "law firms are doing very, very
well"); see also Liz Hoffman & Jennifer Smith, Elite Law Firms Reign as Megadeals Blossom, WALL STREET J.,
July 14, 2014, at BI (discussing the success of the top five firms due to Megadeals).
4. See Aric Press, Am Law 100 Analysis: The Super Rich Get Richer, AM. LAW. (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202651706887/Am-Law-I 00-Analysis-The-Super-Rich-Get-Richer-
?slreturn=20140915093251 (surveying the top 100 U.S. law firms by revenue and noting that, unlike their
counterparts, the "Super Rich firms-the 20 with [profits per partner] of at least $2 million and [revenue per
lawyer] of at least $1 million"--outperformed the financial averages by four or five percentage points...").
5. See CITI PRIVATE BANK & HILDEBRANDT CONSULTING LLC, 2015 CLIENT ADVISORY 3 (2015),
https://www.privatebank.citibank.com/pdf/CitiHildebrandt20l5ClientAdvisory.pdf (finding the "continued
growing separation in the market between the most profitable [law] firms and the rest" with respect to
transactional work); see also Hoffman & Smith, supra note 3 (noting the "growing gulf in the broader legal
industry as a handful of the most prominent-and profitable-law firms, pull ahead of the pack").
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What accounts for this widening inequality among law firms? The most plausible
explanation is that the top-ranked firms provide clients with one or more valuable benefits
that lower-ranked firms cannot. Focusing on a particular type of legal practice-major
corporate transactions-this Article proposes that law firms that repeatedly engage in the
same type of high-stakes transactions acquire private information about the range of
plausible deal terms and their current market prices that other players cannot replicate. 6
This expertise in the ever-changing, ever-expanding set of "market" deal terms provides
clients with a valuable bargaining advantage in deal negotiations. Law firms that are repeat
players with respect to particular types of corporate transactions use their market
knowledge to procure better economic deals for their clients. Though this hypothesis by no
means rules out other ways in which elite firms add value, it would account for the
seemingly self-reinforcing advantage of high-volume firms. The failure to recognize law
firms' informational role in transactions and its effect on bargaining outcomes reflects a
widespread misunderstanding, akin to equating the role of an investment bank to that of a
commercial bank.
The argument is as follows. Although many corporate transactions become
standardized and even commoditized over time, 7 others involve increasingly complex or
rapidly changing terms for a sustained period of time. The latter type consists of heavily
negotiated, bilateral transactions, characterized by variation in the market price of deal
terms, the constant development of new terms, or both.8 Such transactions stray from the
perfect-market ideal of transparent, uniform pricing. Rather, information about individual
deal terms and their pricing remains largely private (and therefore scarce). For a given deal,
the final set of negotiated terms will be determined by a combination of market forces and
bargaining under incomplete information and will thus be heavily affected by the parties'
respective information in the bargaining stages.
To maximize their gains from this type of transaction, the parties must know the
benefit or cost of each deal term to each party, as well as how to trade off terms against
one another under current market conditions. A necessary-though by no means
sufficient-condition to acquiring that information is real-time access to the terms of a
significant volume of recent comparable transactions. Such market information about deal
terms assists parties with three tasks that are crucial for transactional bargaining: (1)
learning of any new terms that provide value-increasing opportunities; (2) determining
their expected payoffs from each deal term; and (3) determining the value of their outside
option.9 Where do parties obtain this expert information? The most obvious source, I argue,
is law firms that routinely engage in the type of transaction at issue. By definition, private
6. Infra Part 111.
7. See SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 28-33 (describing the evolution of legal services from bespoke to fully
commoditized).
8. Transactions falling within each of these three categories currently include mergers and acquisitions,
private investment find agreements, and leveraged debt financings, respectively, though this need not continue
to be the case.
9. A party's "outside option" is the payoff that it would obtain if it had to break off negotiations for the
current transaction and return to the market for an alternative. In the negotiations literature, the "outside option"
is referred to the "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" (BATNA). The outside option is a key determinant
of a negotiator's results. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GErING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIvING IN 99-107 (Bruce Patton ed., 3d ed. 1981) (providing step-by-step instruction and advice to
finding a mutually agreeable end to negotiations).
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transactions-or public transactions for which some terms remain private-have opaque
term pricing. Law firms retain a near monopoly over the complete deal terms for such
transactions because they are repeat players across a range of different clients. Unlike other
transaction participants, they negotiate and draft the full panoply of transaction terms, from
signing to closing and potentially beyond (through disputes, renegotiation, and resolution).
While third-party data providers have made substantial inroads in aggregating and
comparing corporate deal terms,10 they are largely confined to reviewing publicly available
documents ex post.
The hypothesis that law firms create value through market knowledge is supported by
the changing nature of the transactional work performed at elite law firms. Associates at
such firms may now devote much, if not most, of their time to aggregating and comparing
their firm's "market precedent" in preparation for a client's potential transaction. 11
Unsurprisingly, firms' practices in this regard should tend to become more sophisticated
and routinized as the amount of information to be compiled grows and knowledge-
management technology improves.
This reconceiving of the role played by law firms in corporate transactions challenges
fundamental and longstanding assumptions about the law firm-client relationship. 12 The
rules of professional responsibility for lawyers zealously endorse the confidentiality of
client information. Yet, in practice, clients are paying for law firms' ability to pool
information across clients and to make use of that information in transaction negotiations.
A Fortune 500 company engages a top-tier law firm for its proposed merger precisely
because the firm will know-and use-the terms obtained by similar companies in recent
mergers. Such clients do not seek bespoke, professional service based on a long-term,
confidential relationship. 13 They are, in effect, merely purchasing information from law
firms, which in turn are merely engaged in the increasingly ubiquitous practice of
knowledge management. 14 Yet this form of knowledge management should continue to
generate above-market rents for elite firms, which have better-and sometimes
exclusive-access to the underlying information relative to other market participants.
Finally, this hypothesis of law firm value calls for some optimism about the future of
law firms with elite transactional practices-defined here as those with a significant market
share of the very largest transactions by dollar value-while sounding a cautionary note
10. Companies such as Xtract Research, Practical Law, and The Deal provide searchable databases of key
terms from corporate transactions.
11. See, e.g., Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Professional Development & Knowledge Management
Programs Institution (2013), https://www.wsgr.com/PDFs/professional-development-brochure.pdf (describing
the firm's searchable internal database of precedent transactions). In practice, this knowledge management
exercise may be implemented by law firms in various ways, from using sophisticated database software to track
all of the terms of precedential transactions, or tabulating recent deal terms manually, to the more informal and
traditional practice of simply gathering and reviewing recent comparable transaction documents before beginning
a negotiation.
12. See infra Section V.F (discussing the value of confidentiality and its effect on clients' choice of law
firm).
13. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective,
49 MD. L. REv. 869 (1990) (describing the decline in relationship lawyering).
14. Cf CHRISTOPHER D. MCKENNA, THE WORLD'S NEWEST PROFESSION: MANAGEMENT CONSULTING IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 8-25 (2006) (arguing that management consultants are richly compensated simply for
selling access to their database of information gathered from numerous clients).
2015]
The Journal of Corporation Law
for in-house counsel. Law firms will always retain their private market knowledge as a
crucial advantage over their in-house counterparts, however experienced and sophisticated
the latter may be. For the most part, in-house lawyers are privy only to their employer's
own transactions, in contrast to law firms' real-time access to a wide range of precedential
transactions. The trumpeting of in-house counsel as a solution to spiraling legal costs 15
should thus be more muted: for the most lucrative areas of transactional practice, clients
will continue to seek the most prestigious law firms. 16
We can end our inquiry with another puzzle-that of the ever-expanding law firm.
Various theories have been advanced to explain the increasing prevalence of the mega-law
firm. 1 7 While each of these provides a partial explanation, under this Article's thesis larger
firms also reflect the self-perpetuating informational advantage derived from greater deal
volume. 18
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the existing literature on the value, if
any, provided by transactional lawyers. In Part III, puzzles left unsolved by the existing
literature yield a new theory of law firm value in the transactional context, focusing on elite
firms' market knowledge. Part IV illustrates the market-knowledge hypothesis with a case
study of leveraged financing transactions. Part V clarifies the circumstances in which law
firms' use of market knowledge should be value-increasing, value-shifting, or value-
decreasing, and discusses certain key implications.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A. The Value of Transactional Lawyers: Three Paradigms
As with other professional services, the costs of legal services have been increasing
faster than inflation in recent decades. For clients, then, the question of what they are
getting in return for their legal fees is a pressing one. Yet clients' ability to assess their
15. See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN.
L. REv. 277, 277-80 (1985) (noting the increased prominence of in-house counsel and predicting a corresponding
contraction in the roles played by outside law firms).
16. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J.
CORP. L. 497 (2008) (discussing in detail the considerations involved in choosing between in-house and outside
counsel).
17. See GEORGETOWN LAW CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 2014 REPORT ON THE
STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 1, 9 (2014), https://peermonitor.thomsonreuters.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01
/2014 PM GT Report.pdf (documenting the continued trend toward larger firms and listing the most common
explanations for the phenomenon as "(i) the desire to achieve 'economies of scale,' (ii) the necessity of creating
an 'ever expanding pie' to provide opportunities for younger lawyers... (iii) the need to diversify to protect a
firm against cyclical downturns in specific practices, and (iv) the requirements for a larger market footprint to
better serve the needs of clients").
18. This should not be taken to suggest that law firms should seek to expand indefinitely. Other efficiency-
related concems (such as the notorious difficulties and duplication involved in managing large organizations)
might suggest a maximum desirable size for a given firm. Further, certain firms may be able to increase their
transaction volume without necessarily increasing the number of lawyers, for instance by increasingly delegating
or outsourcing the more routine aspects of transactional work. Among elite law firms, New York-based Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz is well known for adopting this model. See K. William Gibson, Outsourcing Legal Services
Abroad, 34 L. PRAC. MAG. 47 (2008), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice home/law-practic
e_archive/lpm magazinearticles v34_is5_pg47.html (discussing law firms' practice of outsourcing legal work).
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outside counsel's performance is limited. 19 The law firm-client relationship poses the
classic agency problem: the principal (here, the client) lacks complete information about
the agent's (the law firm's) performance of its duties, which allows the agent to act to some
degree in its own interests at the expense of the principal's. 20 The existing literature's focus
on this agency problem puts the cart before the horse, however. Before examining how
well clients are able to monitor and assess their law firms, we should clarify just what it is
that, in the absence of agency costs, law firms would ideally accomplish. Simply put, what
does it mean to be a good lawyer? When a law firm is hired by a corporate client, what is
the value that it is meant to provide? These questions are paramount. The agency-cost
analysis only identifies the ways in which law firms and lawyers may knowingly depart
from their clients' interests, such as by shirking and over-billing. Yet one could easily
imagine a law firm working diligently for its client and billing conservatively, while still
failing to deliver any value. The agency costs involved in the law firm-client relationship
are far from the only, or even the most important, considerations in law firm selection.
Though the agency-cost path is better trodden, scholars have made significant
progress in identifying the sources of value provided by lawyers. The value question is
particularly intriguing in the context of transactional lawyering, which is this Article's
focus. Major corporate transactions, 2 1 such as mergers and acquisitions and financings,
require large teams of lawyers. 22 But what is it that such lawyers do, and why? Unlike the
litigation context, in which the lawyer's role qua lawyer is clear in the public imagination,
transactional lawyers are often accused of--or congratulated for-not being lawyers at all.
Referred to even in firms' own marketing materials as advisers, deal-makers, or business
planners, 2 3 these mysterious figures cost clients a pretty penny in any case.
In his seminal 1984 article, Ronald Gilson dispelled some of the mystery by
identifying transactional lawyers as "transaction cost engineers." 24 He began from the
premise that, in contrast to the standard perfect-market assumptions, corporate transactions
involve substantial transaction costs. 25 Much of these costs stem from the parties'
19. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L.
REv. 1301, 1310 (2001) (noting that, as with all agency relationships, "principals (clients) have little information
about what their agents are doing").
20. See id. at 1309-10 (describing the law fim/client agency relationship); SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 148-
49 (describing the divergent incentives of law firms and their clients).
21. For purposes of this Article, "major corporate transactions" are defined loosely as corporate transactions
that represent all or a significant portion of the enterprise value of at least one party or that involve significant
changes in the capital structure, assets, or organization of the corporation.
22. See Ribstein, supra note 1, at 763 (noting large financial transactions require teams of lawyers spanning
multiple departments and areas of expertise).
23. See SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 5 (noting the phenomenon of "lawyers denying that they are lawyers").
24. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J.
239, 255 (1984) (emphasis removed); see also Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Costs
Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REv. 239, 250-51 (1995) (describing the various means-both contractual and relational-
by which Silicon Valley lawyers may reduce transaction costs in venture capital financings); Peter J. Gardner, A
Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century: Adding Value to the Client's Enterprise in the
Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 17, 36 (2003) (discussing the role of business lawyers in
the legal professional); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation
for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
25. See Gilson, supra note 24, at 253 (noting "pervasive" transaction costs in real-world transactions).
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asymmetric information as to the true value of the asset to be transferred between them.26
In the sale of a company, for example, the seller is always better informed about the
company's value than the buyer, making it difficult to reach a deal and to price it accurately.
Gilson hypothesized that good transactional lawyers minimize such information costs for
the parties, for example by allocating each risk involved in the transaction to the party best
able to bear it.27 For the sale of a company, for example, lawyers craft provisions such as
seller representations and warranties, perhaps backed up by the seller's obligation to
indemnify the buyer in the event of a breach. Such provisions provide more information
and greater assurances to the buyer as to the value of the company and therefore increase
the likelihood that a deal will be reached and correctly priced. Thus, by minimizing
transaction costs, transactional lawyers can increase the parties' joint surplus (value) from
the transaction, making both sides better off. Among other merits, Gilson's theory is
comforting to both lawyers and clients: it entails that, in hiring transactional lawyers,
clients are better off relative to a hypothetical lawyer-free deal.28
A competing paradigm to the transactional law firm as "transaction cost engineer" is
that of the law firm as "reputational intermediary" or "gatekeeper" in corporate
transactions. 29 In this view, law firms perform the service of renting their good reputations
to clients, thereby enabling them to complete a desired transaction or to obtain better terms
for the transaction. Take, for example, a start-up company seeking to secure new funding
through an initial public offering (IPO). The dearth of reliable information about the start-
up relative to, say, an established public company presents a major obstacle to attracting
investors. If the company or its underwriters hires a highly reputable law firm for the IPO,
26. Id. at 269.
27. Id. at 259 n.50.
28. Interestingly, the debate over whether transactional lawyers add or subtract value remains unresolved.
Gilson's hypothesis is, by his own admission, theory-based, and to the author's knowledge has not been directly
tested empirically. Gilson argues that transactional lawyers must add value (rather than simply redistribute it
between the parties); otherwise, the parties would jointly agree not to use lawyers. See id. at 245-46 (stating
clients would not hire lawyers for transactional work if value were not added). Jeffrey Lipshaw argues that this
assumption of value-creation may be unwarranted. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Beetles, Frogs, and Lawyers: The
Scientific Demarcation Problem in the Gilson Theory of Value Creation, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 139, 142
(2009) (noting that, if anecdotal evidence is to be believed, many clients feel that their lawyers were a negative-
value proposition). For specific types of transactions, some evidence points to elite law firms having a positive
impact on transactional value. See, e.g., C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and Merger
andAcquisition Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 192 (2013) (finding that top-tier law firms are associated with
better outcomes for clients in mergers and acquisitions but declining to specify the precise mechanism by which
this is achieved).
29. See Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REv. 15, 18-19 (1995) (arguing
that elite law firms act as reputational intermediaries for their clients, but noting the decline in this function over
time); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 512-13 (1994) (discussing lawyers' reputational role in litigation);
Gilson, supra note 24, at 290-93 (discussing lawyer's role in verifying information in acquisitions); Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 61 n.20
(1986) (stating that banking law firms are reputational intermediaries in the market); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical
Rules, Agency Costs, andLaw Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REv. 1707, 1739-40 (1998) (arguing elite firms perform
societal functions such as policing corporate clients' behavior). The concept of a "reputational intermediary"
originated in a seminal article by Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman and is not limited to lawyers. See Ronald
J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 621 (1984)
(describing the investment banker as a reputational intermediary).
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however, this signals to investors that the company has undergone some amount of due
diligence and provides some assurance-though not an enforceable one-against fraud or
misrepresentation by the company as to its value. In other words, to some degree the law
firm's reputation stands in for material information about the company that investors would
otherwise require. In the "reputational intermediary" model, law firms with established
reputations provide a certification function for their clients, similar to that of well-reputed
auditors.30 While the law firm-as-gatekeeper thesis has spawned considerable discussion,
the empirical evidence for it is decidedly mixed.
3 1
Taking instead a bottom-up approach to the question, Steven Schwarcz derived a third
paradigm for the value provided by transactional lawyers. 32 Based on a large-scale survey
of both corporate clients and their outside counsel, Schwarcz concluded that business
lawyers primarily add value (if at all) by acting as regulatory compliance experts. 33 More
precisely, law firms assist clients with major corporate transactions principally by
navigating both client-specific and transaction-specific regulatory concerns. 34 While
Gilson had dismissed the importance of regulatory issues in corporate transactions,
35
Schwarcz's work puts such concerns back at the center of transactional practice.
36
30. Adopting a much broader definition of transactional law than Gilson, George Dent has proposed that
business lawyers act as "enterprise architects" for their corporate clients. See George W. Dent, Jr., Business
Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUs. L. 279, 281 (2009) (arguing the lawyer's role in avoiding business
obstacles is of greater importance than his or her role as transaction-cost engineer). While Gilson's model rests
on the paradigm transaction of the corporate acquisition, Dent's view encompasses all of business law, and in
particular transactions involving long-term business relationships such as joint ventures and venture capital
investments. Because these ongoing relationships are characterized by incomplete contracting, Dent argues that
lawyers provide a wider range of services than those involved in transaction-cost engineering, including balancing
the client's interests across many transactions and navigating extra-contractual norms of trust and cooperation
among the business people. Though this Article's hypothesis of the value provided by elite law firms reasonably
extends to Dent's broader vision of transactional practice, for ease of discussion the Article's coverage is limited
to Gilson's narrower scope, consisting of major corporate transactions involving the transfer of a capital asset,
such as mergers and acquisitions and financing arrangements. See Gilson, supra note 24, at 249 (defining a
transaction as the transfer of a capital asset).
31. See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes et al., Underwriters' Counsel as Gatekeeper or Turnstile: An Empirical
Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 164, 165 (2007) (finding support for
the hypothesis that higher-quality law firms preserve some independence relative to the issuer in IPOs); Michael
Bradley et al., Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the Sovereign Debt Market?, 38 INT'L. RIv. L. & EcoN. 150, 162 (2014)
(failing to find evidence that law firms act as reputational intermediaries in the sovereign debt markets). See
generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional Curiosities, 33
J. CORP. L. 95 (2006) (reviewing the "mixed and occasionally even contrary empirical results" on the performance
of reputational intermediaries).
32. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.




35. See Gilson, supra note 24, at 247 (noting that business lawyers often operate in areas with minimal or
no regulation).
36. Despite their differing emphases, there is likely to be considerable overlap in the transaction-
engineering and regulatory-expertise paradigms in practice, where, for example, lawyers seek to minimize the
impact of regulatory concerns on transaction surplus. Gilson's theory sought a purely private-ordering role for
lawyers that creates value; that is, a raison d'8tre for transactional lawyers in the absence of regulation. See Gilson,
supra note 24, at 246-47 (describing his goal as identifying "a purely private ordering role for" transactional
lawyers). Yet Gilson would readily acknowledge that when lawyers seek to minimize the costs imposed on a
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B. The Value of Transactional Lawyers: What's Missing
There are thus three broad paradigms for the role lawyers play in major corporate
transactions: transaction-cost engineer, reputational intermediary, and regulatory expert.
Each one resonates as being clearly and intuitively correct;37 these are not conflicting
hypotheses among which we must choose. Yet the picture they collectively provide
remains incomplete. In particular, they fail to fully account for one of the most salient
features of current transactional practice: the overwhelming market share for major
corporate transactions held by top-tier law firms. 3 8 For such "mega-deals," we can count
on one hand the number of firms that dominate the market for each type of transaction. 39
Table 1: Combined Market Share of Top Five Law Firms By Transaction Type: U.S.
Market (2014).40
% Market Share of % Market Share of
Top 5 Firms by Deal Top 5 Firms by Deal
Volume Count
Transaction Type




Issuer Advisers [$403 billion] [879]
43.6% 37.8%
US Corporates
Manager Advisers [$602 billion] [1003]
29.1% 22.6%
US High Yield
Issuer Advisers [$98 billion] [190]
transaction by regulatory concerns, they are engaged in a form of transaction-cost engineering.
37. Of course, the degree to which each theory carries explanatory weight in practice depends highly on the
particular transactional context.
38. See Hoffman & Smith, supra note 3, at BI (noting that, in the first half of2014, the top five law firms
held more than 75% of the U.S. mergers and acquisitions market share by deal dollar value).
39. See id. (describing how a small number of firms dominate this type of transaction).
40. Data compiled from the Global Legal Advisor: League Tables, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/professional/content/uploads/sites/4/Bloomberg-HI -2015-Global-Legal-
Advisers.pdf. The figures for M&A advisers were adjusted to correct for double-counting in advisory roles.
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63.5% 58.2%
US High Yield
Manager Advisers [$214 billion] [411]
37.3% 24.4%
US Syndicated Loans
Issuer Advisers [$111 billion] [107]
67.1% 54.9%
US Syndicated Loans
Manager Advisers [$221 billion] [252]
24.9% 17.9%
US M&A
Acquirer Advisers [$936 billion] [695]
27.7% 21.2%
US M&A
Seller Advisers [$215 billion] [256]
28.9% 16.5%
US M&A
Target Advisers [$808 billion] [265]
The market concentration of elite firms aligns poorly with existing theories of
corporate value. Take the example of the sale of a large public company. If Gilson's
transaction-cost engineering hypothesis were the only plausible source of law firm value,
then the seller should hire the most expensive law firm only if the company were faced
with a truly novel problem, such as devising a new transaction structure in response to a
recent regulatory change. For a transaction such as the sale of a large public company, the
mechanisms for allocating risks efficiently between the parties have long since been
devised, as Gilson freely acknowledges,4 1 through contractual provisions such as
representations and warranties, closing conditions, eamouts, termination rights, break-up
fees, and so forth. Rather than seeing the same top-tier law firms used over and over again
for the same type of transaction, we would instead expect to see the top-tier firms used for
the first-or first few--of each type of transaction. For subsequent transactions, the work
could safely be relegated to lower-ranked (cheaper) firms, no matter how large the
transaction. Instead we observe that the size of the transaction correlates closely with the
41. See Gilson, supra note 24, at 257 ("[T]he general contents of the [acquisition] agreement have by now
become pretty much standardized.").
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quality or ranking of the law firms used by the party, regardless of the novelty or
complexity of the deal. 42
The reputational-intermediary hypothesis is even less suited to the observed pattern
of elite law firm use. Recall that, under this hypothesis, the intermediary's reputation acts
as a substitute for information about the company. A law firm's good reputation thus
creates value only to the extent that a party to the transaction or third-party beneficiary
thereof-such as potential investors in an IPO-lacks reliable, material information about
the company at issue. For a merger of equals between two major public companies,
however, a law firm's reputation would be of little benefit to the parties, given the relative
surfeit of available information about each. For such transactions, the reputational-
intermediary hypothesis would predict that the parties would hire lesser law firms. Yet,
these are precisely the sorts of transactions for which law firms with the most established
reputations are routinely engaged.
The regulatory expert hypothesis fares the best among the three, as it does not predict
the opposite of the observed pattern of law firm usage. And yet it does not fully account
for this pattern. Continuing with the example of the sale of a large public company, it is
certainly the case that any major corporation today faces a highly complex regulatory
environment. Yet if that is so, the corporation would be best served by simply relying on
the law firm that is most familiar with it and its specific regulatory concerns (its relationship
firm), rather than on the most elite firm, with whom the company may have had little or no
prior dealings. Again, the public-company merger is a well-trodden path, and though
regulatory hurdles are involved, they are no longer novel or mysterious. 43 Stated
differently, the firm-specific regulatory costs likely outweigh the transaction-specific
regulatory costs. Any competent law firm with a transactional practice could therefore fit
the bill, and one that is intimately familiar with the company's particular regulatory issues
would therefore seem best suited to the transaction. Yet this is not what we observe. For a
major merger, the company will tend to engage one of the handful of top firms that
specialize in that type of transaction, rather than its relationship firm. 44 What, then, best
explains this pattern of law firm selection? This is the task to which the Article turns in
Part Ill.45
42. See Jeffrey Manns & Robert Anderson IV, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1143,
1150, 1155 (2013) (stating that "almost all sizable transactions involve elite law firms" and noting "the almost
universal use of a prominent law firm for large-scale transactions").
43. See Gilson, supra note 24, at 247 (claiming that "business lawyers frequently function in a world in
which regulation has made few inroads" and where "there is virtually no law to apply").
44. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between the size of the transaction
and the quality of the law firm involved).
45. Before proceeding, it is worth dismissing-or, rather, correctly identifying-an alternative hypothesis
for why elite law firms are breaking from the pack when it comes to major corporate transactions. The scholarly
and practitioner literatures frequently refer to "star" lawyers or teams of lawyers for which clients will pay
extraordinary fees. See John C. Coates et al., Hiring Teams, Firms and Lawyers: Evidence of the Evolving
Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1028 (2011) (stating clients view
lawyers as a critical resource and will switch firms ifa specific lawyer leaves). These legal geniuses are apparently
so sought after that they, and therefore the law firms at which they practice, are able to command above-market
rents. This story of individual or team talent is simply the legal services equivalent of the economic principle that
the returns to top talent have increased dramatically as a result of globalization and technological change. See
Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 845 (1981) (describing the contemporary
phenomenon of a small number of individuals earning a disproportionate share of the income for certain types of
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III. A NEW THEORY OF LAW FIRM VALUE: AGGREGATING MARKET INFORMATION
Whether implicitly or explicitly, the existing paradigms of transactional lawyer value
all reflect the notion that law firms gain a valuable advantage by repeatedly performing the
same types of transactions. As high-volume players for a particular transaction, they
acquire some skill or characteristic that cannot easily be replicated by firms that are relative
novices to the game. The three paradigms simply disagree on what that particular skill or
characteristic is. Under Gilson's transaction-cost engineering hypothesis, repeat-player law
firms gain a keen understanding of the risk-allocation and information-eliciting devices
involved in that type of transaction. 46 Under the reputational-intermediary hypothesis, law
firms over time develop a reputation for accurately representing what they know (and do
not know) about their client to third parties, including the client's transaction counterparty,
potential investors, and regulators. Under the regulatory expertise hypothesis, experience
with a given transaction type provides a keen appreciation for the regulatory challenges it
presents and how best to manage them.
As this Part demonstrates, repetition provides law firms with yet another valuable
advantage: knowledge of the ever-changing and ever-expanding set of value-increasing
terms for that particular transaction and of their market "price." The case for this missing
piece of the value puzzle is set forth in Section JII.B below, through three fundamental
claims relating to certain complex, bilaterally-negotiated 47 corporate transactions: (1) in
services). The latter has become a standard explanation for the extraordinary compensation paid to top
entertainers, athletes, and corporate executives in a globalized economy. The top law firms earn above-market
rents, we learn, simply because they are able to identify and hire the most legal superstars. Among transactional
lawyers, for example, such superstars would no doubt include Marty Lipton, the inventor of the "poison pill"
antitakeover device, which single-handedly stemmed the tide of the 1980s' hostile takeover wave and
revolutionized the practice of mergers and acquisitions in the United States. See Michael J. Powell, Professional
Innovation: Corporate Lawyers andPrivate Lawmaking, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 423, 433-41 (1993) (describing
the development of the poison pill at Wachtell Lipton and the firm's efforts to publicize it).
As applied to law firms, the superstar theory is merely a particularly stark instance of either the
transaction-cost engineering hypothesis or the regulatory expertise hypothesis, or both. Star lawyers are described
as outstanding problem solvers, yet the problems they address can, in practice, be classified as minimizing
transaction costs, addressing regulatory concerns, or a combination of the two. What still requires elucidation are
the precise conditions under which clients require the services of a superstar lawyer or superstar team of lawyers.
Again, well-established corporate transactions such as routine, public-company mergers and acquisitions seem
ill-suited for the services of superstar lawyers. Thus, despite its intuitive appeal, the superstar theory-like its
parent theories of transaction-cost engineering and regulatory expertise-fails to fully account for elite law firms'
dominance in major corporate transactions. The superstar theory also falters as an account of the current law firm
landscape in that individual lawyers having a dramatic, innovative impact on a particular transaction type or
practice area are, in practice, likely to be vanishingly rare.
46. Gilson, supra note 24.
47. The remainder of this Part assumes that the transaction and the agreements through which it is effected
are negotiated between two parties, referred to as the counterparties. Though such agreements will be referred to
as bilateral, the number of parties bound by the agreement or having rights under the agreement need not be
limited to two. In fact, most financing transactions ultimately bind many investors or grant such investors rights
as third-party beneficiaries, but in practice are negotiated solely between the company and the large financial
institution serving as the lead underwriter or arranger. At the opposite end of the spectrum from the complex,
highly negotiated bilateral agreements at issue in this Article is the consumer contract of adhesion (such as a click-
through license for a popular software product). The take-it-or-leave-it terms of such contracts are not negotiated
at all, and bind a very large, dispersed group of unsophisticated consumers. See generally Ronald J. Gilson et al.,
Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms,
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order to maximize their surplus from transactional bargaining, clients require access to
market information-that is, access to the full set of terms of recent comparable
transactions; (2) such market information is often private; and (3) high-volume law firms
have the best access to market information. As will be shown below, certain transactions
are characterized either by constant innovation in terms or by rapidly changing market
prices, including for non-price terms. For such transactions, the parties cannot count on
market competition to provide them with the payoff-maximizing set of deal terms; they
must instead look to market information to improve their bargain.
A. The Needfor Market Information
Over time, certain types of contracts can become commoditized, by operation of the
market or even by regulatory fiat. Consumer insurance contracts, for example, may have
terms that are substantively identical from one insurer to the next and are never negotiated
with the consumer. Uniform terms and the absence of bargaining make the contracting
process a simple exercise: the consumer need only look up the going market price and
decide whether or not to transact.4 8 Whether corporate transactions are becoming or should
become commoditized is the subject of much commentary and, among law firms,
considerable angst. Every category of corporate transaction already presents some degree
of standardization, as reflected in the recurrence of "boilerplate" provisions, for instance. 4 9
Yet that is a far cry from commoditization. At any given time, there is some subset of
corporate transactions that lies far on the spectrum from commoditized agreements. Such
transactions tend to be heavily negotiated on a bilateral basis, in clear contrast to consumer
contracts of adhesion. Though there is significant overlap among merger agreements, for
example, in the end each agreement presents a unique combination of terms and unique
variations in such terms because they are tailored to some degree to the particular target
company and the counterparties and, as we will see, to current market conditions. 50 The
parties expend significant resources negotiating the deal terms, and for reasons discussed
further below, they expect that the final agreement will depend heavily on the outcome of
the negotiation process. For the remainder of this Article, references to "corporate
transactions" will be to negotiated, bilateral transactions of this type. The need to bargain
in such transactions creates strong ex ante incentives for the parties to acquire information
that will maximize their payoff. As shown below, the combination of novel deal term
generation and rapid shifts in the set of "market" terms for certain transactions explains
why market information is so valuable to transaction counterparties.
88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 170 (2013) (noting how the number of "traders" affects the contract terms).
48. This is not to suggest that such contracts are necessarily efficient. A growing literature identifies
conditions under which such contracts of adhesion do not maximize social welfare. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1233 (2003)
(disputing the classic law and economics doctrine that sellers are incentivized to offer only efficient contract terms
to consumers, on the grounds that consumers can only take into account a limited number of contract terms when
making purchasing decisions).
49. See generally Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1129 (2006)
(discussing the characteristics and importance of "boilerplate" contract provisions).
50. See generally Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in
Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51 (2013) (noting that debt contracts must be tailored to the borrower).
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1. Novel Deal Terms: The Ever-Expanding Bargaining Frontier
Regardless of their degree of regulatory overlay, major bilateral transactions are
predominantly characterized by privately negotiated terms. 5 1 What, then, determines the
scope of the parties' bargain? Inmost cases, the parties should consider all value-increasing
terms, that is, all terms that would increase the parties' joint surplus from the transaction,
regardless of how that surplus is ultimately distributed between them.52 Yet theoretical
accounts of bargaining fail to acknowledge that the set of value-increasing terms may be
far from obvious. There is no fixed set of deal terms for the parties to negotiate: the list is
jointly determined by the parties and can be expanded or contracted virtually at will. 53
Crucially, the recent thrust has been decidedly toward expansion for certain types of
transactions. 54 Whether or not lawyers are partly to blame, the set of terms considered open
to negotiation in these major U.S. transactions appears to be growing both continually and
at an increasing clip. New terms are constantly being introduced-whether to
accommodate regulatory developments, changing market conditions, or party-specific
needs-and at a faster pace than obsolete terms are discarded. Complex corporate
transactions thus commonly result in negotiations over hundreds of terms.
This seemingly exponential growth in deal terms may plausibly be driven by several
factors. First, the substantive complexity of financial instruments and transactions has
increased dramatically in recent decades. 55 It should come as no surprise, then, that the
legal manifestations of modem finance in transactional agreements are themselves
increasingly complex. 56 Securitization transactions, for example, result in an impressive
array of lengthy, complex agreements. 57 Second, regulation is also increasing in
complexity, prompting novel deal terms and deal structures.5 8 Third, as technology has
51. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REv. 227, 239 (2010) (arguing that even
regulatory constraints provide an opportunity for lawyers to innovate in structuring transactions).
52. Even if a particular term would help one party and harm the other, it is nonetheless value-increasing if
it helps the one party more than it harms the other. In this case, the parties should be able to reach a deal that
includes the term in question and that makes them both better off, or at least does not make any party worse off:
the party that is made better off by the term at issue can simply offer to trade something worth at least as much as
the harm suffered by the other party.
53. See, e.g., Libeau v. Fox, 880 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 2005),judgment entered, (Del. Ch. July 9,
2005), aff'd inpart, rev'dinpart, 892 A.2d 1068 (Del. 2006) ("When parties have ordered their affairs voluntarily
through a binding contract, Delaware law is strongly inclined to respect their agreement, and will only interfere
upon a strong showing that dishonoring the contract is required to vindicate a public policy interest even stronger
than freedom of contract.").
54. See Neal H. Brockmeyer, M&A Practice in the Early Years, 17 DEAL POINTs 1, 7 (Winter 2012) (noting
that "purchase agreements were much shorter" for mergers and acquisitions in previous decades).
55. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REv.
211 (2009) (examining the complexities of the modem financial markets); see also Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood
Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.
J. 1457, 1458 (noting the "unprecedented rate" of innovation in financial products).
56. See CHARLES M. FOX, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW SCHOOL DOESN'T TEACH You 74
(2d ed. 2008) (noting that the increased complexity of transactions has led to increasingly complex agreements).
57. See, e.g., Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Pooling and Servicing Agreement (Asset-Backed Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2005-R4) (May 1, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1328390/000088
237705001419/d336334-ex4_1.htm (giving a typical example of a pooling and services agreement for asset-
backed securities).
58. See Fleischer, supra note 51, at 239 (discussing how lawyers can help minimize the impact of regulation
by changing the legal structure of deals).
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improved, the costs associated with the production and sharing of complex transactional
agreements have declined. 59 The switch from the typewriter to the word processor and
from mail to email has significantly increased the rate at which agreements can be drafted
and lowered the costs of negotiating and amending them. It is now cheaper and easier to
create and negotiate longer transactional agreements with more specialized or tailored
terms. Fourth, as law firms have increased in size, they have proved better able to manage
more complex agreements-for example, by involving regulatory specialists to draft or
negotiate specific provisions-and to innovate more, if only because they have more
resources to devote to these tasks. Discussion of a fifth possibility-that law firms
themselves are exogenously (and self-interestedly) responsible for the increase in the
number of deal terms-is deferred until Section V.B below.
The preceding list of explanations for the surge in deal terms is unlikely to be
exhaustive. Whatever the causes, the agreements governing certain transactions appear to
comprise an ever-greater set of terms. This proliferation of new terms makes it difficult for
uninformed parties to determine the bargaining frontier of value-increasing terms. Yet
parties who are unaware of new, value-increasing terms are simply leaving money on the
table in their negotiations. Further, even if the parties are aware of a new term, if they lack
sufficient information to value it correctly, they will achieve less favorable bargaining
outcomes. For transactions experiencing rapid innovation, access to market information
should prove exceptionally valuable.
2. Market Shifts in Non-Price Terms
Other types of transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions, are heavily negotiated
despite relatively little innovation in terms. 60 Market information can be crucial even in
such cases, because (1) the price of every transaction term can vary according to market
conditions, yet (2) a party cannot simply assume that it will obtain the "market terms" in
its own negotiations, even if the market is competitive. To see why, let us first define the
"market price" of a particular transaction term as the average price 6 ' of that term at a given
point in time, holding all else constant, where the "price" of a term is the aggregate value
59. See Brockmeyer, supra note 54, at 7 (noting the delays in previous decades associated with typewritten
agreements for M&A transactions); see also Fox, supra note 56, at 122 (describing the effect of technological
change on the drafting of transactional agreements).
60. See Gilson, supra note 24, at 257 ("[T]he general contents of the [acquisition] agreement have by now
become pretty much standardized.").
61. We need not assume here that terms are priced uniformly and efficiently. Indeed, we should expect at
least some dispersion in the pricing of a given transaction term by market participants. See, e.g., MAUREEN
O'HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY 53 (1995) (summarizing several information-based models of
markets under which spreads occur). Transactional agreements are not commodities and accumulating evidence
suggests that their terms are not perfectly priced. See Manns & Anderson, supra note 42, at 1186 (concluding that
deal protection provisions in merger agreements are not priced by the market); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
From Pigs to Hogs 1 (Jan. 7, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-2434272 (finding that
differences in Greek sovereign bond contracts were priced by the markets at certain times, but not others); Victoria
Ivashina & Anna Kovner, The Private Equity Advantage: Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship Banking, 24
REv. FIN. STUD. 2462, 2463 (2011) (concluding that the view that leveraged loans are commodities is mistaken).
Precisely because information about deal terms is scarce for certain complex corporate transactions, we should
instead expect the same term to be priced slightly differently in different transactions. Nonetheless, the concept
of a market price for any given deal term is a useful one.
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of what one party must trade in order to obtain the other party's consent to it. If a lender
wants a borrower to accept a particular event of default in the loan agreement, for example,
the price of that term might be a decrease in the interest rate.
62
The key result is that every term in a transaction agreement-including every non-
price term63-has a market price and changes in such market prices should affect the final
deal reached by the parties in any particular negotiation. 64 The notion that a transaction's
price term varies with market conditions is intuitive. The price term in an IPO, for example,
is the amount to be paid by the underwriter for the issuer's stock. We readily accept that
such price terms are subject to change over time, according to shifts in supply and demand.
The IPO market may get very "hot" during some periods and command high prices, but
may "dry up" and yield lower valuations in others, for the very same types of issuers. 65
Yet, as shown in recent work, non-price transaction terms can vary with market conditions
as well.6 6 Moreover, even in a market with many participants on both sides of the
transaction, the parties cannot simply assume that they will end up with the set of all value-
increasing terms-even when the set of such terms is known-instead, the outcome of their
negotiation will depend in part on their relative bargaining power and their respective
information about non-price terms. 6
7
62. Note that in many (if not most) cases, we cannot readily assign a dollar value to the tradeoff, such as
where the tradeoff is of one borrower-favorable "non-price term" for a lender-favorable "non-price term". This is
not problematic for the proposed definition, however. Moreover, while some contract terms are binary in nature
(i.e., they are either included in the agreement wholesale or not at all), others instead exhibit a discrete or
continuous range of values, whether qualitative or quantitative (such as the interest rate, or a covenant that can be
made more or less restrictive along a continuum). In all events, to the extent that a particular term affects the
parties' respective expected payoffs from the transaction differentially, including the term in the agreement should
result in a reasonably equivalent tradeoff.
63. Contracts scholars tend to distinguish between "price terms" and "non-price terms" in agreements.
Similarly, business teams involved in corporate transactions commonly distinguish between "business" or
"economic" terms and "legal" terms. While there is no clear principle for distinguishing between the two, price
or business terms tend to capture the fundamental economic deal between the parties (and are therefore generally
numeric), while non-price or legal terms are the remainder of the contractual provisions governing the transaction.
64. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 50, at 71-72 (demonstrating how the non-price terms of debt contracts
can vary with market conditions).
65. See Jean Helwege & Nellie Liang, Initial Public Offerings in Hot and Cold Markets, 39 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 541, 542 (2004) (concluding that hot IPO markets are the result of greater investor
optimism, rather than greater firm growth prospects).
66. Choi & Triantis, supra note 50, at 71-72; see WILLIAM WHELAN, LEVERAGED FINANCIAL MARKETS:
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO HIGH-YIELD BONDS, LOANS, AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 5 (William F. Maxwell
& Mark R. Shenkman eds., 2010) (noting that "the concept of 'market' [in a high-yield financing] evolves over
time" and depends on several factors); Martin Fridson et al., Do Bond Covenants Affect Borrowing Costs?, 26 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 79, 80 (2014) (finding evidence that the strength or weakness of bond covenants does not
result in adjustments to bond prices).
67. A dominant strain of law and economics doctrine holds that changes in bargaining power should have
no effect on the non-price terms of a contract. On this view, supply and demand in the market produce a single,
efficient set of non-price terms for a given transaction type; the parties' relative bargaining power only leads to
adjustments to the price term. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract
Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1668 n.4 (2012) (compiling several examples of scholarly work in the law and
economics vein assuming the absence of bargaining power with respect to non-price contract terms and critiquing
this "irrelevance principle"). In contrast to this literature, Choi and Triantis have identified several conditions
under which bargaining power can affect the non-price terms of various contracts, including the example used
here of multi-stage negotiations. Id. at 1680-96; see also Manns & Anderson, supra note 42, at 1174 ("[T]here is
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How do we explain this seeming paradox, that at any point in time there is a set of
"market" terms for a particular transaction, yet the parties cannot count on the market to
get them a deal on such terms? One explanation is that many transactions-including
mergers and acquisitions and loan transactions-are negotiated in stages, 68 with the price
terms settled in the earliest stages (by the principals) and the non-price terms negotiated in
later stages (primarily by counsel). 69 The distinguishing feature of such multi-stage
negotiations is that the price terms agreed to up-front are remarkably sticky: 70 regardless
of how negotiations over the non-price terms ultimately unfold, it is highly unlikely that
the parties will adjust the price terms to which they originally agreed. 71 This timing
mismatch in the negotiation of price and non-price terms leaves room for bargaining power
imbalances and market shifts to affect not only the price term but also the non-price
terms. 72 The parties will need to bargain over the non-price terms, creating incentives to
acquire information that will help them determine (1) the expected payoff to each party of
every transaction term, 7 3 and (2) the value of the parties' respective outside options. 7 4
in fact considerable variation in the deal-specific terms [of merger agreements] and that variation largely results
from the relative leverage of the two parties.").
68. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1690 (discussing bargaining power in two-stage negotiations).
For leveraged-loans, the negotiation stages are as follows. First, the borrowing company solicits bids for financing
from various lead arrangers. Such bids typically cover the price terms of the financing, as well as a subset of non-
price terms that the parties view as crucial to have agreed upon in advance. The second stage of negotiations
begins once the borrower selects the winning lead arranger and signs a commitment letter with respect to the
agreed-upon terms. At this point, the borrower and lead arranger negotiate all of the remaining terms of the loan
transaction, to be reflected in the final credit agreement. See Ivashina & Kovner, supra note 61, at 2469
(describing the transaction steps for a leveraged-loan financing for a private equity-sponsored acquisition).
69. Typically, the "business" teams will initially agree to the price terms-and perhaps a small subset of
non-price terms deemed particularly fundamental-in a term sheet or letter of intent, for example. Subsequently,
counsel will begin drafting the transaction agreements, leading to several rounds of negotiations over the
remaining non-price terms. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1690 (describing how bargaining power plays
out in the two stages of negotiations).
70. See id. (stating that where the deal price is set in the first stage of negotiations, non-price terms "are
usually settled without adjustment to price"); Manns & Anderson, supra note 42, at 1176 (stating that the price
and other economic terms of a merger are agreed upon separately from negotiations over the legal terms, and that
"the financial 'deal' is typically independent of the legal terms of the agreement").
71. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 67, at 1690-91 (noting that while the parties could theoretically reopen
negotiations over the price terms while negotiating the non-price terms, the "nonlegal costs" associated with doing
so make it highly unlikely that this will occur).
72. Id. at 1680-86.
73. A party's payoff from a transaction term is the net dollar value gain or loss to the party from including
the term in the agreement. Where a term's payoff is uncertain, in that there are multiple potential payoffs, the
expected payoff is the probability-weighted average of all possible payoffs from the term. In a corporate
transaction, it is worth recalling that just as the capital asset to be transferred between the parties-the company
to be sold, the amount to be loaned, etc.-has an expected payoff to the parties, so do each of the other deal terms,
including "legal" or "non-price" terms such as closing conditions, remedies for breach, choice of law clauses, and
so forth.
74. A party's outside option for a given negotiation is its expected payoff from breaking off the current
negotiations and returning to the market to negotiate with another party. The parties' respective outside options
affect the final deal they will reach-including whether they will reach a deal in the first place-because, in most
bargaining contexts, how much a party should demand or give up for any particular term depends rationally on
the value of its next best alternative. A party with a very good outside option compared to the other party has less
incentive to reach a deal, and therefore, can demand better terms and try to capture most of the deal surplus from
the other party. On the other hand, a party lacking a good outside option will be more eager to reach a deal, even
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Market information-that is, information about all of the terms of recent comparable
transactions-fulfills precisely this role.75
B. Market Information About Deal Terms Is Often Private
Complex corporate transactions may thus involve an ever-expanding set of potentially
negotiable terms, each of which is subject to market conditions. Yet it turns out that
information about the pricing, prevalence, and even the existence of various deal terms
often is not public, and therefore is not readily accessible to potential counterparties to a
transaction. First, many large corporate deals are private. Transactions that do not involve
a public company or otherwise trigger a public disclosure requirement under the securities
laws will, absent unintentional leaks or voluntary disclosure, involve deal terms that remain
entirely private. Only the counterparties and, to varying degrees, their respective advisors
and service providers will know of the final deal reached on all points.
Second, the extent to which the terms of public deals are in fact publicly available is
overstated. Consider again the consummate example of a public deal-the acquisition of a
public company. Because the acquisition agreement must be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), certainly many deal terms-including the most material
economic terms-will be available to the public. Yet even for such transactions, the parties
never file the complete set of transaction documents with the SEC, as only the key
agreements are required to be disclosed. 76 The documents that are not filed may contain
terms that even the parties themselves would view as highly significant, such as those
relating to the background tax and regulatory structuring of the deal.
More importantly, even when they involve public companies, many transactions that
would clearly be viewed as major transactions by virtue of their dollar amount nonetheless
escape filing obligations entirely. For a corporation such as Wal-Mart, a $500 million bank
financing might not exceed the materiality threshold for mandatory disclosure under the
securities laws, and thus would not require any of the transaction documents to be filed.77
The deal terms, which would be of considerable interest to comparable companies seeking
financing, remain hidden from the market in such cases. Finally, because novel terms arise
frequently, there is inevitably some delay in achieving widespread publicity and adoption
of these terms. While information about a novel term will eventually trickle into the public
sphere (through practitioner articles, public deals, etc.), until that time, counterparties
negotiating a transaction may be entirely unaware of it.
C. High- Volume Law Firms Have the Best Access to the Full Package of Deal Terms
For many major transactions, then, real-time market information is both a valuable
good and, because it is private, an excludable one. As repeat players, high-volume law
firms have the best access to the full range of terms for recent transactions, through the
on relatively unfavorable terms. See supra note 9 (explaining outside options).
75. While the expected payoff to a party from a particular term need not be market-determined-it may be
unique to the party-in many cases the market price of the term will be the best available information about the
value of that expected payoff, particularly when the term is novel or complex.
76. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(a)(4) (2011) (mandating disclosure of "material" agreements for companies
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
77. Id.
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sheer volume that they handle and their monopoly over the drafting of transaction
agreements. 78 While other market participants-such as the transaction parties themselves,
the parties' in-house counsel, investment banks, accounting firms, and third-party services
that compile and compare deal terms-all have varying exposure to and familiarity with
deal terms, we should expect the transactional practices at elite law firms to have the most
comprehensive access. Transactional lawyers are by definition assigned the task of
negotiating the vast majority of deal terms and the exclusive tasks of drafting and
maintaining the execution version of all transaction documents. They are the de facto deal
constituency most intimately familiar with all of the final terms of such transactions.
79
Transaction parties, by contrast, only have access to deal terms for their own prior
transactions. Major transactions are rare in any individual corporation's life, compared to
a large law firm's transactional practice. Management should thus tend to be relatively
poorly informed as to both the current set of plausible deal terms for any particular
transaction and their current pricing in the market. Importantly, the very same critique
applies to in-house counsel. In examining companies' decisions of whether to "make or
buy ' 80 legal counsel for corporate transactions (i.e., whether to hire in-house counsel or to
engage outside counsel), scholars have yet to note that in-house counsel is at a decided
disadvantage relative to law firms when it comes to current market information. While
large corporations may have teams of in-house lawyers with transactional experience, such
lawyers necessarily lack exposure to changing market terms, and this disadvantage grows
with the number of years they remain in-house.
Yet law firms are not the only repeat players for major corporate transactions. Various
advisers and other service providers to the parties may also have exposure to a high volume
of transactions, and of these, some-such as investment banks, accounting firms, and credit
rating agencies-may be both sophisticated and keenly aware of market movements. 8 1
Investment banks, in particular, specialize in helping clients to price transactions. 82 Of all
market participants involved in corporate transactions, they are the best known for their
ability to track market movements and even time the markets to get clients the most
favorable deal terms. Yet, investment banks' knowledge and experience with deal terms is
largely centered on the price terms of a transaction (also referred to as the "business terms"
or "economic terms"). In particular, they and other deal advisors lack law firms' complete
access to the deal documentation, and in particular are less able to identify and interpret
the non-price or "legal" deal terms. As drafters and keepers of the deal documentation
across many clients, law firms are best positioned to maintain a repository of the full range
78. See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
133, 142 (2014) ("[A]ttomeys at large law firms will typically have access to a significant number of existing
contracts that may be mined for innovative provisions.").
79. See Gilson, supra note 24, at 257 ("[T]he business lawyer's role in corporate acquisitions is
pervasive.").
80. See Schwarcz, supra note 16 (providing a detailed analysis on the tradeoffs between in-house and
private counsel).
81. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 620 (1984) (introducing the concept of "reputational intermediary" for market actors that, through repeat
business, are able over time to establish reputations for certifying information about other actors).
82. See Jack Bao & Alex Edmans, Do Investment Banks Matter for M&A Returns?, 24 REV. FN. STuD.
2286, 2312-13 (2011) (finding that a client's choice of investment bank for a merger or acquisition affects its
returns from the transaction).
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of possible deal terms-both "business" and "legal." Thus, while we can safely posit that
advisors such as investment bankers may have an advantage over transactional lawyers in
pricing key economic terms, there is at least some subset of transaction terms for which
law firms will have the advantage. 83 Finally, a market has recently developed for
knowledge-management services that sell summary deal-term information.8 4 While the
proliferation of such products confirms that deal-term aggregation and comparison are
valuable functions, the risk that they will eventually usurp law firms' role in this regard is
minimal, precisely because law firms have access to, and can make use of, private deals
and other private market information.
IV. MARKET INFORMATION IN PRACTICE: A CASE STUDY
Market information about transaction terms is thus both valuable and excludable, and
the barriers to entry in acquiring it are high. The law firms that sell market information
should therefore expect to be rewarded with persistent rents. Part IV uses a case study of
the U.S. leveraged-loan market to illustrate how law firms can assist with term pricing. It
begins with relevant background on leveraged-loan transactions and documentation. The
pricing exercise is then illustrated through stylized cases in which a law firm's
representation of the borrower may be value-adding, value-shifting, or value-decreasing,
all with respect to the very same transaction term.
A. Leveraged Loans: Background
As a relative newcomer to the U.S. capital markets, the leveraged-loan market has
experienced both tremendous growth in volume and liquidity and significant innovation in
its legal terms. 85 Leveraged loans are primarily characterized by two features: (1) they are
83. What of clients who are themselves repeat players for particular transactions? Where the investment
bank is the client, for example, rather than the advisor, it inevitably relies on its knowledge of recent transactions.
On the other side of the negotiating table, various categories of investors, including in particular private equity
firms, are also high-volume participants in major corporate transactions such as mergers and acquisitions and
leveraged financings. See generally Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 115 (2013) (arguing that reputable private equity firms render the debt markets more
efficient). And yet, paradoxically, such investors appear to be the most likely to engage top-tier law firms for their
transactions. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 535-37 (2009)
(demonstrating that the largest private equity firms tend to engage the same small group of elite, repeat-player
law firms for their acquisition and financing transactions). Three explanations seem plausible. First, it may be
that private equity firms are simply paying for law firms' knowledge of other clients' deal terms (even if
confidentiality obligations prevent law firms from explicitly revealing one client's deal terms to another, law
firms inevitably make use of this information in advising their clients and in negotiating deal terms). Second,
precisely because they are sophisticated repeat players, investment banks and private equity firms are keenly
aware of both the value of market knowledge and their specific lacunae in that regard. As discussed above,
investment banks and private equity firms have less access to and knowledge of the "legal" terms of transaction
agreements than law firms, yet are savvy enough to know that they can benefit from seeking out high-volume law
firms for assistance with such terms. Third, private equity firms negotiate against investment banks for most of
their acquisition and financing transactions and will therefore rely on repeat-player law firms precisely to counter
investment banks' market knowledge.
84. Practical Law, Bloomberg Law, Xtract Research, The Deal, and many others, all include products that
perform a function similar to the one this Article ascribes to elite transactional law firms, namely aggregating and
comparing terms from recent large deals.
85. See generally Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, Managing Regulatory Blindspots, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 89
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extended to companies having a relatively high proportion of debt in their capital structure,
and (2) they are intended to be syndicated. 86 The lender group (or syndicate) typically
consists of a highly diverse mix of banks and non-bank institutional investors. 87 Post-
issuance, many of these loans are subsequently traded on an increasingly liquid secondary
market.
Despite heavy secondary trading, leveraged loans are not treated as securities and
therefore are not subject to federal securities regulation. 88 This has two significant
implications for our purposes. First, leveraged loans are issued privately, such that, unless
the borrower is otherwise subject to securities reporting requirements, the loan documents
will not be publicly available. Second, leveraged-loan transactions remain to this day very
lightly regulated. As such, they are prime examples of complex, heavily negotiated, and
highly tailored agreements, the terms of which remain largely private. Further, they are
negotiated in stages, with the price terms-and certain non-price terms-set before the
remainder of the non-price terms are negotiated, increasing the parties' need for market
information on the individual non-price terms.89
The tremendous growth in the leveraged-loan market has been mirrored by
tremendous innovation in terms. Leveraged-loan credit agreements saw a surge in novel
provisions in the boom period preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis and again during
the crisis itself, when borrowers scrambled to renegotiate their loans and creatively
navigate a difficult lending environment. While commentators frequently note the lack of
innovation in many legal documents, 90 leveraged-loan transactions provide an impressive
counterexample. 9 1 In the course of less than a decade, dozens of new provisions were
(2015) (assessing the regulation of leveraged loans).
86. Syndicated loans are typically underwritten or arranged by a single investment or commercial bank and
ultimately funded by a large syndicate of lenders. Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, NEW ENG.
ECON. REV. 45, 45-46 (Jan. 1993), http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/neer/neerl993/neer193c.pdf.
87. The non-bank institutional investors may include structured asset pools (referred to as collateralized
loan obligations) designed to hold syndicated loans, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, private
debt funds, and sovereign wealth funds.
88. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan Market, 39
J. CORP. L. 725, 747 (2014) (discussing the differing regulatory treatment of loans and bonds).
89. See supra Section III.A.2 (discussing the implications of setting the price term first in multi-stage
negotiations).
90. See generally, MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITs OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2013) (identifying lawyers' puzzling failure to update a
boilerplate provision in sovereign debt contracts, even in the face of negative court decisions); Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of
Boilerplate'), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 718-29 (1997) (describing the circumstances in which the use of boilerplate
provisions provide economic benefits); Barak D. Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77,
82 (2011) (characterizing the lack of contractual innovation by law firms as a form of Taylorism). For an overview
of competing theories of contractual innovation, see generally Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract
Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2013) (comparing various contractual innovation theories).
91. See Allison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, Evolution of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan Markets,
in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 21, 23-24 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds.,
2007) (describing the origins and growth of the syndicated loan market). While we need not resolve why the
leveraged-loan market witnessed such a high rate of contractual innovation, plausible contributors include the
role of highly sophisticated participants (private equity firms on the borrower side and major investment banks
on the lender side), rapidly changing market conditions and financing structures, the shift in composition of
lending syndicates (from traditional commercial banks to structured asset vehicles and other institutional
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developed that, over time, became standard loan terms. 92 As the drafters, and often the
originators, of such provisions the select group of law firms handling most leveraged-loan
financings were in the best position to price such terms for clients during the period of
sustained innovation.
B. Leveraged Loan Pricing Using Market Information: Application
As leveraged-loan syndicates have increased in size and the secondary trading of
leveraged loans has become routine, borrowers have faced greater obstacles to
renegotiating their loan terms after the initial closing. A borrower may seek to renegotiate
a loan's terms for any number of reasons, 93 and such requests for amendments or waivers
are relatively common. 94 Importantly, the transaction costs involved with renegotiations
increase with the size of the lender group and the amount of secondary trading among
lenders: collective action problems arise as the number of lenders increases and the
duration of their respective loan holdings decreases. 95 Each lender has less incentive and
ability to familiarize itself with the borrower and the loan terms, has more incentive to free-
ride on the monitoring efforts of other lenders, and has more incentive to hold out against
otherwise value-increasing changes to the loan terms in the hopes of extracting a side-
payment.
Because the leveraged-loan market's surge in size and liquidity occurred so rapidly,
this lender collective action problem manifested suddenly. Under the circumstances, a
novel loan provision that would facilitate loan renegotiations without dramatically altering
the relative leverage of the borrower and the lenders in such renegotiations would prove
extremely valuable. This is precisely how the "yank-a-bank" provision was developed and
began appearing in credit agreements for private leveraged-loan financings. The "yank-a-
bank" is a contractual innovation in loan agreements that, among other uses, permits (but
does not require) the borrower to replace any lender who votes against a proposed loan
amendment simply by repaying that lender's share of the loan at par. 96 Such a provision
incentivizes lenders overall to vote in favor of loan amendments and decreases the
investors), and very light regulation.
92. Without the assistance of a law firm specializing in leveraged loans, a company seeking financing
during this period would almost certainly be entirely unaware of "market flex," the "SunGuard clause," "excess
cash flow prepayment step-downs," "equity cure rights," "covenant-lite," "amend-and-extend rights," "loan
buyback Dutch auctions," and other novel provisions, and thus risk foregoing significant transaction value. See
PRACTICAL LAW GLOSSARY, http://us.practicallaw.com/us-glossary (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (describing these
terms).
93. For example, the borrower may be motivated to seek a loan amendment to cure an unintentional and
minor breach, to loosen the financial covenants in the credit agreement, to obtain permission to engage in an
otherwise prohibited transaction such as a merger or acquisition, to extend the maturity of the loans, and so forth.
94. See Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Private Versus Public Lending: Evidence From Covenants, in
THE YEARBOOK OF FIXED INCOME INVESTING 253, 253-74 (John D. Finnerty & Martin S. Fridson eds., 1995)
(noting that "private debt ... require[s] more frequent renegotiation than public debt").
95. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the US. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 378 (2002) (noting that syndicated
loans have fewer covenants than traditional bank loans).
96. See RICHARD WIGHT ET AL., THE LTSA's COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE 575-76 (2009)
(describing the use of the yank-a-bank provision to replace lenders who do not consent to credit agreement
waivers or amendments).
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likelihood that lenders can successfully extract hold-up payments from the borrower in
exchange for consenting to the amendment.
All else being equal, the yank-a-bank provision increases the borrower's leverage vis-
d-vis lenders in renegotiations. Then, under a credit agreement containing a yank-a-bank
provision, the borrower should end up paying out less to the lenders in aggregate (either in
the form of amendment fees or concessions in the loan agreement) when it renegotiates
loan terms, making the borrower better off at the lenders' expense. At the same time,
however, the yank-a-bank provision also provides a benefit to the lenders that may or may
not offset this effect. While a loan is outstanding, events occur that are unanticipated by
either side and therefore by the loan agreement; in some cases, an amendment to the loan
would benefit both the borrower and the lenders. 97 Thus, preventing individual lenders
from blocking or delaying such loan amendments is in the interest not only of the borrower
but also of the lenders taken as a group.
Ultimately, whether it is in the lenders' interests to adopt the yank-a-bank provision
in a credit agreement-thereby both lowering the transaction costs of loan renegotiations
and granting the borrower greater leverage in such renegotiations--depends on
contingencies such as the expected size of the lender group, the expected amount of
secondary trading in the loan, the likelihood that the loan will have to be renegotiated, and
the probability of good behavior by the borrower. Whether including the term proves to be
value-increasing will thus largely depend on whether these contingencies are correctly
taken into account when pricing the yank-a-bank provision at the time the credit agreement
is negotiated. The four cases below, all relating to the yank-a-bank provision, illustrate
some of the ways in which transactional lawyers' interventions in deal negotiations could
affect the aggregate surplus generated by the deal. In each case, the relevant comparison is
between the outcome when the client employs a law firm with market knowledge-an
"informed law firm"-and when the client employs a law firm or in-house counsel without
market knowledge.
1. Case 1: The Informed Law Firm's Intervention Is Value-Increasing by Informing the
Counterparties of a Mutually Beneficial Term
First assume a high-quality, well-behaved borrower, such that if the borrower
proposes a loan amendment during the life of the loan, the amendment is likely to be value-
increasing for the lenders in aggregate. The lenders should thus be happy to grant the
borrower additional bargaining leverage ex ante in loan renegotiations in order to avoid
lender holdout problems that might preclude such an amendment or make it costlier.
Assume also that the lender syndicate is expected to be very large, with substantial
secondary trading of the loan, such that lender collective action problems would normally
be severe. Under such circumstances, we can safely assume that both the borrower and the
lenders would be made unambiguously better off by including a yank-a-bank provision in
their credit agreement. More specifically, their respective expected payoffs from the
97. Assume, for example, that the borrower unintentionally defaults on the loan due to a mere technicality-
such as failing to deliver its financial statements to the correct address for the administrative agent-rather than
due to deteriorating performance or bad borrower behavior. If the borrower's credit risk remains fundamentally
sound, it is likely to be in the lenders' interests to waive the borrower's default to avoid accelerating the loan and
triggering the borrower's bankruptcy, which would likely significantly decrease the value of their loan holdings.
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leveraged-loan transaction would be higher if the term were included, as reflected in the
following sample dollar values:
Table 2: Case 1
Gross Gross expected Change in
expected payoff w/yank- expected payoff
payoff w/o a-bank from adding
yank-a-bank provision term to credit
provision agreement
Borrower $10M $12M +$2M
Lenders $10M $10.5M +$0.5M
Assume that, in the absence of high-quality financing counsel, the parties would be
entirely unaware of the yank-a-bank provision. So long as the additional cost of hiring an
informed law firm compared to an uninformed firm does not outweigh the gains, both
parties are better off-net of legal fees-as a result of including the provision in the credit
agreement. By making the parties aware of a novel term, the informed law firm has
increased the joint surplus from the transaction.
2. Case 2: The Informed Law Firm's Intervention is Value-Increasing by Assisting with
the Pricing of a Term
Now assume a lower-quality, more opportunistic borrower, facing a smaller lender
group (and therefore lower transaction costs of renegotiations). Under these circumstances,
giving the borrower more leverage in renegotiations should come at a slight cost to the
lenders, all else being equal:
Table 3: Case 2
Gross Gross Change in "Price" range
expected expected expected at which
payoff w/o payoff w/ payoff from parties
yank-a- yank-a- adding term should agree
bank bank to credit to add term
provision provision agreement to credit
agreement
Borrower $10M $12M +$2M $1-2M in
borrower
Lenders $10M $9M -$1M concessions
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Notwithstanding that the lenders' expected payoff from the yank-a-bank provision is
negative, they should agree to include the term so long as the borrower makes other
concessions in the credit agreement worth at least $1 million to the lenders. The borrower
should agree to include the term so long as the concessions demanded by the lenders do
not exceed $2 million in value. At any "price" within that range (net of legal fees), the
parties will achieve a jointly value-increasing deal. But notice that this requires the parties
(1) to be aware of the existence of the yank-a-bank provision, (2) to correctly determine
their expected payoffs from including the yank-a-bank provision in the credit agreement-
requiring informed predictions as to the borrower's behavior, the likelihood of
renegotiation, the size of the lender group, the amount of secondary trading, etc.-and (3)
to identify provisions in the credit agreement of equivalent value to the agreed-upon "price"
of the yank-a-bank provision. The third step is required given that, as discussed above, the
price terms for leveraged loans are typically fixed at the outset of the negotiations, such
that negotiations over non-price terms must be effected through adjustments to other non-
price terms, rather than to the price terms. As all three tasks require experience with current
market conditions, an informed law firm can bring the parties within the bargaining range
of a value-increasing deal for both, net of legal fees.
3. Case 3: Informed Law Firm's Intervention is Merely Value-Shifting
Assume all of the same facts as in Case 2, except that the parties are already aware of
the yank-a-bank provision, and would, using uninformed counsel, have arrived at a value-
increasing deal by including the provision in the credit agreement in exchange for
concessions by the borrower worth $2 million to the lenders. Now imagine that the
borrower's law firm correctly informs the borrower that, based on its review of recent
transactions, the "market" price of the yank-a-bank provision for similar credit facilities is
only $1.5 million-that is, the borrower's outside option is a credit agreement that includes
the yank-a-bank provision in exchange for only $1.5 million in borrower concessions. The
borrower will now negotiate harder for this provision, for example by threatening to break
off negotiations and exercise its outside option and might thus successfully bring the price
down to $1.5 million (or lower if the lenders are uninformed as to the true market price).
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Table 4: Case 3
Gross Gross Change in "Price" at "Price" at
expected expecte expected which which
payoff d payoff parties parties
w/o payoff from would agree would agree
yank-a- w/ adding to add term to add term
bank yank-a- term to w/o law w/ law firm
provisio bank credit firm intervention
-n provisi- agreement intervention
on
Borrow $10M $12M +$2M $2M in $1.5M in
-er borrower borrower
concessions concessions
Lender $10M $9M -$1M
With a deal at $1.5 million for the yank-a-bank provision (compared to $2 million),
the informed law firm's intervention has clearly made the borrower better off. Yet all that
has occurred is a shifting of deal surplus from the lenders to the borrower: the total gross
surplus to the parties remains unchanged relative to the deal that they would have reached
on their own. Thus, taking into account legal fees, the informed law firm's intervention has
actually reduced net social surplus.
4. Case 4: Informed Law Firm's Intervention is Value-Decreasing for Both Parties
Finally, assume a low-quality borrower and a very small lender group, with no
secondary trading of the loan post-issuance. Because the transaction costs of renegotiation
are low in this case, we can posit that the benefit to the borrower from a yank-a-bank
provision would be low, while the costs to the lenders from ceding negotiating leverage to
the borrower would be significant, as reflected in the following figures:
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Table 5: Case 4
Gross Gross Change in "Price"
expected expected expected range at
payoff w/o payoff w/ payoff from which
yank-a-bank yank-a-bank adding term parties
provision provision to credit should agree
agreement to add term
to credit
agreement
Borrower $10M $10.5M +$0.5M
None
Lenders $10M $7M -$3M
In this case, there is no price at which both parties are made better off by including the
provision in the credit agreement; they should not agree to include the term. An informed
law firm acting faithfully on behalf of its client would not introduce the term into the
negotiation. If the firm wishes to increase its legal fees at its client's expense, however, it
might try to convince the parties to spend time bargaining over the term, making both
parties worse off. In that case, the firm will have used its information advantage in such a
way that not only reduced the joint surplus from the transaction but also made its own client
worse off.
To conclude Part IV, leveraged-loan financings represent one of several transaction
types for which repeat-player law firms can extract significant rents by aggregating and
deploying private information about market transaction terms. This opportunity exists
because (1) such financings involve complex, heavily negotiated terms that are generally
private; (2) multistage negotiations leave room for the exercise of bargaining power; and
(3) pricing their terms would be exceptionally difficult for one-off players. Yet a law firm's
experience with market terms is no guarantee that it will add value to the transaction;
plausible scenarios exist for value-increasing, value-shifting, and value-decreasing
behavior, as elaborated further in Part V below.
V. Is THIS REALLY VALUE? SOME CLARIFICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Notwithstanding its favorable description of the role played by repeat-player law
firms, this Article has provided no assurance thus far that law firms' market knowledge
will on average create value in corporate transactions. It has merely described in general
terms why such market knowledge may create value and why clients appear willing to pay
for it. Part IV addresses the value-proposition of law firms' market knowledge more
rigorously. We cannot conclude a priori that transactional lawyers create a positive-sum
game for the parties. Instead, transactional lawyers' contribution may, for any given
transaction, fall into one of three possible categories: (1) value-adding (i.e., increasing the
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joint transaction surplus, net of legal fees); 98 (2) value-shifting (i.e., making their client
better off, but solely at the expense of the transaction counterparty, thereby reducing joint
transaction surplus once legal fees are taken into account); or (3) value-decreasing (defined
here as both reducing joint transaction surplus and making their own client worse off). This
Part discusses the conditions in which lawyers' market-information function falls into each
of these three categories.
99
A. Value-Adding vs. Value-Shifting
Law firms can use their market information to shift value, rather than to increase it.
Because they are negotiated in stages, with the price terms fixed upfront, 10 0 many
corporate transactions leave significant room for value-shifting behavior. The extent of
value-shifting behavior will be determined largely by the parties' relative bargaining
power. Yet the parties' relative information also plays a role. Recall that law firms' market
knowledge is potentially valuable because complex corporate transactions are
characterized by incomplete and asymmetric information. 101 Where new deal terms are
constantly arising, where market forces rapidly affect the relative prices of all deal terms,
and where information about such terms and their market prices is rarely public, the
counterparties are likely to hold inaccurate and divergent beliefs about the market price of
each term. They may even be unaware of the existence of certain deal terms that would
increase their surplus from the transaction. Negotiations over transactional terms, then,
represent a particular instance of bilateral bargaining with incomplete information. 102
When the counterparties value transaction terms differently and are not aware of each
others' valuations, their negotiated agreement should create less joint surplus than under
perfect information. 103 To the extent that transactional lawyers provide one party with
better information about deal terms and their current pricing, they may either increase the
size of the joint transaction surplus, making both parties better off, or simply increase their
client's share of the transaction surplus, making that party better off at the other party's
expense.
A firm's knowledge of market terms is more likely to be value-adding when it
decreases the parties' information asymmetry because symmetrically informed parties
should price terms close to their market values. Equivalently, whether a law firm's
intervention increases aggregate transaction value or merely shifts value in favor of one
party may depend on the original direction and degree of the information asymmetry
98. See Gilson, supra note 24, at 243 (defining value-increasing behavior by transactional lawyers).
99. The other functions plausibly served by transactional lawyers-including transaction-cost engineering,
gatekeeping, and regulatory expertise-are ignored for this purpose.
100. See supra Section ILI.A.2 (discussing multi-stage negotiations in which the price terms are set first).
101. See Gilson, supra note 24, at 253 (noting that information about capital assets is "one of the most
expensive and poorly distributed commodities"); id. at 251 (recalling that business lawyers cannot add value in a
world in which the perfect-market assumptions are satisfied).
102. See, e.g., Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, 31
OPERATIONS RES. 835, 837-39 (1983) (providing a model of bilateral bargaining under incomplete information).
103. See id. at 836 (stating that "[b]argaining under uncertainty will, in general, fail to be Pareto efficient");
William Samuelson, Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 995, 1004 (1984)
(concluding that the parties in a bilateral monopoly bargaining game may fail to reach mutually beneficial
agreements when information is asymmetrically distributed).
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between the parties. Assume that Party A is significantly more informed than Party B with
respect to the scope and pricing of deal terms. If Party B hires an experienced law firm that
mitigates its informational disadvantage, we should expect more efficient bargaining and
an increase in the overall transaction value to result. If, on the other hand, Party A hires an
experienced law firm that further increases its informational advantage relative to Party B,
the informational asymmetry between the parties will be exacerbated, potentially allowing
more transaction value to be shifted toward Party A at Party B's expense.
The implications are, admittedly, both intuitive and predictable. When a company that
rarely engages in large transactions is negotiating opposite a major investment bank, for
example, it would do well to seek a high-volume law firm as its counsel. On the other hand,
an investment bank armed with a high-volume law firm can, if the other side is poorly
represented, capture much of the transaction surplus for itself by exploiting and
exacerbating the other side's informational disadvantage. The investment bank will come
out ahead, net of legal fees, even if the overall transaction value has been reduced by their
counsel's intervention in the transaction.
B. Value Decreasing
When a law firm engages in value-shifting, it is still acting as a faithful agent to its
client: it seeks to maximize its client's surplus, even if doing so results in less aggregate
surplus to be shared between the parties. Yet a firm might also be incentivized to use market
information at the expense of its own client. If so, law firms with market information can
conceivably make both parties worse off. Recall, for example, that new terms are
constantly being introduced in the market for certain types of transactions. There is no pre-
determined scope of bargaining or fixed number of terms to be negotiated, and the set of
terms ultimately negotiated by the parties will be largely determined by their counsel. For
a given transaction, imagine that the lawyers continue indefinitely to add items to the list
of terms to be negotiated, subject to the sole constraint that they be at least marginally
related to the subject matter. At a certain inflection point, the cost of negotiating all of these
terms (including legal fees, the client's time, the costs of interpreting or amending the
agreement ex post, etc.) will exceed the benefits (the increase in transaction surplus from
the additional terms), and the client's expected payoff will begin to decline, as illustrated
by the curve in Figure la.
While a firm with market knowledge should, by definition, have a good sense of
where the inflection point lies, the less-informed client may not. Unfortunately, the firm's
private incentives may cause it to continue beyond that point: the lure of increased billable
hours can lead to excessively lengthy negotiations and overly complex agreements. While
firms' reputational concerns should limit this type of agency cost, they are unlikely to
eliminate it. 104 Beyond a certain point, the practice of acquiring, maintaining, and utilizing
market knowledge of deal terms amounts to a lawyer-created solution to a lawyer-created
problem.
104. See Coates, supra note 19, at 1310 ("[L]awyers determine key terms in the 'corporate contract,' due to
agency costs between owner-managers and their lawyers.").
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Figure la: Relationship Between Payoff to Client and Number of Negotiated Deal Terms







The mere fact that the number of deal terms has been increasing for certain
transactions should not alone be viewed as evidence of greater agency costs, however. As
argued above, the cost of compiling and using market knowledge has declined in recent
decades due to technological advances and larger law firms. Thus, the point at which the
client's payoff begins to decline from negotiating an additional term has almost certainly
shifted outward for such transactions (as illustrated by the dotted curve in Figure lb), thus
justifying a larger number of negotiated deal terms.
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C. Conditions Under Which Market Knowledge Should Provide Value to Clients
We can now delineate more precisely the conditions under which market information
will indeed be value-increasing in a transactional context. First, for a firm's market
knowledge to provide any benefit to its clients, the transaction's terms cannot be entirely
standardized (that is, non-negotiable) and uniformly priced in a competitive market. In
other words, the relevant transaction agreement cannot be a commodity. 105 While much of
the finance literature treats corporate transactions-and, implicitly, transactional
agreements-as commodities, for many transaction types this is far from the case. In
particular, bilateral transactions in which the terms are heavily negotiated and tailored to
the particular parties should, as discussed above, involve disparate pricing and allow for
bargaining power to affect non-price terms. 106
Second, market information must be scarce in order to be valuable. As aggregators of
market information, law firms can extract greater rents when their market knowledge is
costly to obtain. We therefore look for transactions with terms that are private or that
change so rapidly that their publicity alone is not sufficient for clients to price them
accurately. Similarly, law firms' use of market knowledge is more likely to be value-
increasing if there is no altemative source of market information. The recent emergence of
service providers that aggregate transactional deal terms is a development to be applauded,
yet as discussed above, they are unlikely to match law firms' access to private deal terms.
Third, a transaction involving significant asymmetry in the parties' knowledge of deal
terms should generate the greatest benefits from a law firm's market knowledge, so long
as the firm represents the lesser-informed party. This suggests that unsophisticated parties
can benefit the most from law firms' market knowledge, particularly when they are facing
a transaction counterparty that is itself a repeat player, such as an investment bank or large
private equity firm. Yet the prediction that unsophisticated parties would be more likely to
hire firms with market information does not seem to be borne out in practice: the most
sophisticated clients tend to hire repeat-player law firms for transactions. 10 7 This may
simply reflect another information problem. Unsophisticated clients may not adequately
appreciate their bargaining disadvantage or correctly identify firms that can remedy it.
Sophisticated parties should be well aware of the advantage of market knowledge and
therefore, surprisingly, be most likely to make use of elite counsel.
Fourth, large transactions benefit more from law firms' market knowledge than do
small ones, all else being equal. With large transactions (as measured by the overall deal
105. Richard Susskind has established a classification for the degree to which contracts can be
commoditized. See SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 28-33. Susskind argues that, over time, any given contract type
will tend to move along the path from fully bespoke (meaning that the contract is drafted entirely from scratch)
to fully commoditized, with intermediate steps in which the contract is standardized, systematized, and packaged.
Currently, agreements such as highly-leveraged financing and mergers and acquisitions are far from
commoditization. We need not speculate if and when that will change, but we can safely predict that there will
always be some subset of transactional contracts that are highly complex, highly negotiated, and rapidly changing,
even though that subset may change over time. For such transactions, so long as the terms remain largely private,
high-volume law firms will have a major advantage and rent-seeking opportunity if they are able to aggregate and
make use of their market knowledge.
106. See supra note 67 (discussing the literature on bargaining power in corporate transactions).
107. See Davidoff, supra note 83, at 535-37 (demonstrating that the largest private equity firms tend to
engage the same small group of elite, repeat-player law firms for their acquisition and financing transactions).
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price), the cost of engaging a high-volume law firm is more likely to be offset by the
additional benefit from obtaining better economic terms. The latter explains why the most
elite firms are so profitable: they specialize in market information with respect to the very
largest corporate transactions.
Finally, law firms with market information are more likely to create value when the
agency costs in their relationships with clients are low. They are more likely to use their
market knowledge to increase clients' share of transaction surplus, rather than to prolong
negotiations beyond the value-maximizing point, if there is some check on their ability to
exploit clients in this fashion. Such checks might include the client being a repeat player
for the transaction at issue (resulting in less informational asymmetry between firm and
client), the client having an experienced general counsel or other senior in-house lawyers
with a transactional background (resulting in better monitoring of the firm), or the law firm
having an established (and therefore valuable) reputation for providing faithful service to
clients.
To summarize, law firms' market knowledge will be the most valuable for large,
bilaterally-negotiated, complex, private transactions. The law firms that are able to compile
and gain expertise in market information about transaction terms tend to be large, repeat
players for such types of transactions. Thus, contrary to the prevailing predictions for Big
Law as a whole, the small subset of law firms that meet these requirements should continue
to charge high fees, grow larger, resist commoditized legal work, perform work that in-
house counsel cannot, and attract business even from clients with which they have no
ongoing relationship.
D. Do Law Firms Really "Price" Transaction Terms?
Firms' knowledge of management practices with respect to market information vary
considerably, yet we can make certain generalizations about how they compile it and how
they use it. The starting-point for law firms' market knowledge is, as discussed, a large
volume of the final transaction documents for a particular transaction type. Through their
representation of several different clients, high-volume law firms naturally build up such a
supply. The terms of these transactions can then be compared across deals, as in tables
(grids) presenting similar transactions side-by-side and covering each of their material
terms. 10 8 With the further addition of database software, lawyers can search for a specific
deal term to determine whether it was included in recent transactions and in what specific
form. So long as clients' documents are intemally accessible to all lawyers in a given
practice group, regardless of which lawyers actually drafted them, every lawyer has access
to the firm's market information. The degree of sophistication of knowledge-management
practices is firm-dependent, but in all cases the benefit of each additional transaction inures
to the entire firm.
Once market information has been compiled, stored, and made accessible, firms must
decide how to make use of it. Preparing comparison tables of terms and simply sharing
108. What's Market, PRAC. L., http://us.practicallaw.com/resources/us-whats-market (last visited Nov. 8,
2015). For an example of what such a table might look like, select the "Compare" option for selected deals. Note,
however, that this database includes only publicly available transaction documents, and the tables cover only a
very small subset of the material terms in any given transaction. In practice, law firms' comparison tables would
be significantly more detailed.
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them with a client may, on its own, afford the client a bargaining advantage, if the client is
sufficiently sophisticated to interpret the information and use it to devise its bargaining
position. 10 9 In most cases, however, the firm's market information will instead serve to
instruct the lawyers themselves as to current market conditions. They can then in turn
instruct clients as to what to ask for in negotiating terms (at the term sheet stage, for
example, where the business teams take the lead) or use the information themselves during
negotiations (in the later stages that are dominated by lawyers).
The question, of course, is how exactly lawyers translate market information into
specific moves in a transaction negotiation. As discussed, market information is valuable
in that it (1) informs clients of new terms, and (2) helps them "price" terms, which is
shorthand for estimating the likely concessions that it can extract from the counterparty
and the value of those terms to the client. Yet what does it mean to suggest that lawyers
engage in pricing terms? That they would assign specific dollar values to each potential
term in a negotiation is plainly implausible. Yet, in most cases, they can achieve effectively
the same outcome by developing an intuitive understanding of the value of specific terms
and combinations of terms. The latter is sufficient for them to become skilled at two forms
of pricing: risk equalization and relative pricing.
First, we are not accustomed to thinking of lawyers as engaged in pricing, in part
because lawyers more often speak in terms of risk than value. Lawyers have become highly
adept at determining what combinations of terms will result in the same level of risk for
their client under current market conditions. Take, for example, the negotiation of a large
corporate loan. The borrower may request a provision granting it the right to sell a certain
value of assets without requiring lender permission. Lender's counsel may then request
additional collateral from the borrower, for example, with the goal of having the borrower
present the same credit risk as before. There is thus little distinction between assessment
of risk and estimation of value in practice.
Second, we also fail to recognize lawyers as engaged in pricing because they are
undoubtedly better at relative pricing than at absolute pricing. It is easier for a transactional
lawyer to advise a client that it could do "better" by negotiating with a different
counterparty than it is to estimate precisely how much more surplus the client could obtain
from negotiating with a different counterparty. Similarly, transactional lawyers are likely
to be more accurate at ranking terms against one another ("Term A should be worth more
to you than Term B") than at ascribing a specific value to each term ("Term A should be
worth x dollars to you").
Thus, to the extent that transactional lawyers price terms, they admittedly do so only
informally, and likely on the basis of relative rankings of terms and options, rather than by
assigning specific dollar values. As practiced by transactional lawyers, term pricing is, as
the clich6 goes, more art than science.1 1 0 The larger point is that nothing in this Article
should be taken to suggest that lawyers can price terms perfectly accurately. Rather, the
109. Whether sharing information in this manner across clients is permissible under existing rules of
professional conduct will depend on the precise details of the representation and the form and scope of the
information provided. See infra Section V.F (discussing the value of confidentiality).
110. See, e.g., Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A
Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REv. 189, 217 (1995) (noting that "value
maximizing contractual decisions require judgment rather than mere mathematical calculations" and describing
such decisions as "more analogous to art than engineering").
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claim is that clients should, on average, be expected to price terms more accurately when
they engage law firms having access to market information than with uninformed counsel
and should therefore obtain better outcomes.
E. Gilson Revisited
A final clarification is in order as to where the market-knowledge hypothesis fits into
the existing literature on transactional lawyering. Given the breadth of Gilson's hypothesis
in particular, we might ask whether firms' expertise in market information is merely a
particular instance of transaction-cost engineering. As an initial matter, none of this
Article's claims would be impaired by placing market knowledge under the broad umbrella
of transaction-cost engineering. Further, as discussed below, there is likely to be
considerable overlap between the two hypotheses at the stage where a lawyer actually
applies the firm's market information to a particular client's transaction. Yet there are
certain dimensions in which the two hypotheses part company.
First, while both hypotheses claim that transactional lawyers mitigate information
problems between transaction counterparties, 111 the categories of information at issue are
distinct, and thus, the role played by transactional lawyers is different under each view.
Gilson helpfully defines a corporate transaction as the transfer of a capital asset between
parties. 112 In acquisitions, the capital asset might consist of stock or corporate assets, for
example. The transaction-cost-engineering hypothesis rests on information asymmetry
between the parties concerning the value of the capital asset to be transferred in the
transaction-in our example, the value of the target company's assets or stock. Lawyer-
crafted provisions such as representations and warranties, for example, enable the parties
to minimize the transaction costs resulting from the fact that the selling party is more
informed about the value of the target company than is the buyer. This Article identifies a
different information set affecting transaction value, namely the range of terms that the
parties should negotiate and their market pricing. Even assuming that the parties are equally
or perfectly informed about the value of the asset to be transferred between them, they may
nonetheless fail to maximize their joint surplus from the transaction: they may simply be
unaware of certain value-increasing transaction terms that have recently appeared in the
market, or they may fail to agree to known value-increasing terms because they have
incorrectly priced them. Where lawyers can assist with market-term awareness and pricing,
they can increase transaction value in a manner that is not strictly contemplated by the
transaction-cost-engineering hypothesis.
Second, while using market information to help clients make more efficient bargains
can surely be characterized as reducing transaction costs, Gilson appears to have a narrower
conception of transaction-cost engineering in mind, based on his own proffered examples.
In his case study of merger agreements, Gilson focuses on lawyer tasks such as crafting
purchase-price adjustments and determining which representations and warranties the
111. Recall that the value of a law firm's market information depends on such information being scarce and,
better still, asymmetrically distributed between the transactional counterparties. Gilson's transaction-cost-
engineering hypothesis also rests on information asymmetry between transaction counterparties. See Gilson,
supra note 24, at 269 (describing the goal of acquisition agreements as "[reducing] ... informational differences
between the parties at the lowest possible cost").
112. See id at 249 ("Characterizing transactions as the transfer of capital assets is important ... .
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parties should make. 113 At base, such provisions all serve the same function: efficiently
allocating uncertainty about the value of the company between the parties. Such terms do
not (or need not) depend directly on the terms obtained by other transaction counterparties
in the market. In other words, transactional lawyers can conceivably engage in transaction-
cost-engineering-under Gilson's understanding of it-without having access to market
information. Conversely, we could imagine lawyers using market information in
transactions without directly engaging in transaction-cost engineering. If a firm's client is
sufficiently sophisticated, for example, simply providing the client with a comparison of
the private terms of recent transactions could, on its own, allow the client to reach a better
bargain: it would amount to a pure sale of market information, divorced from the firm's
expertise in working with such terms.
Where the two sources of law firm value diverge is perhaps best illustrated by the
difference between (1) a senior partner with years of experience working on a particular
type of transaction, but who is the only lawyer at her firm to work on such transactions,
and (2) an associate at a high-volume firm who has access to his firm's database of all
recent transaction terms, but who has negotiated few such transactions on his own. The
first lawyer is a pastiche of a transaction-cost-engineer, while the second represents pure
market information. 114 Note, similarly, that the task of compiling market information is
fairly passive and appears largely distinct from what Gilson envisions as transaction-cost
engineering. When the task turns to applying a firm's market information to a particular
transaction, however, there is likely to be considerably more overlap between the two
hypotheses. Moving from the general (market information) to the specific (applying market
information to a particular client and transaction) undoubtedly requires experience beyond
simply observing other parties' transaction terms, and this begins to look more like
Gilson's transaction-cost engineering. In practice, of course, the two types of knowledge
need not be-and generally are not-mutually exclusive.
F. The "Value" of Confidentiality
If clients engage elite law firms at least in part for their market knowledge, this has
profound implications for the rules and practices relating to the confidentiality of client
information. The premise that clients value confidential legal services is traditionally left
unchallenged, and the rules of professional conduct for attorneys are drafted
accordingly. 115 Yet if clients expect to obtain a better transactional bargain through a firm's
market knowledge, they will happily pay the firm for the use of its other clients'
information, whether implicitly or explicitly. In doing so, rational clients should anticipate
that the firm will, in turn, use their own information for the benefit of other clients. If the
benefit of access to market knowledge is expected to exceed the benefit, if any, from
keeping their own transaction terms confidential, clients will be willing participants in a
113. See id. at 257-62 (discussing the merger agreement process).
114. It should go without saying that the client would be better off with both types of expertise.
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (ABA CTR, FOR PROF'L REsP. 2015) ("A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the
disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by
paragraph (b)."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.9(c)(2) (ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESP. 2015) (imposing
a similar duty of confidentiality with respect to former clients).
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market for transactional terms.
We should not be surprised, then, that a company contemplating a major transaction
would choose to engage a top-tier law firm even where the company has had no prior
dealings with the firm and where the firm has completed similar transactions for many of
the company's direct competitors. In fact, the law firm's knowledge of competitors' deal
terms only increases that firm's value to the company. The prediction that competitors will
seek the same law firm(s) for their transactions stands in direct contrast to the paradigm of
relationship lawyering, under which a company seeks to monopolize the services of a
single law firm, in part to prevent company information from seeping to competitors. 
1 16
Large corporations, investment funds, and financial institutions are well aware that elite
firms also work for their direct competitors. Under the market-knowledge hypothesis,
clients hire such firms not despite this but because of this.
It may thus be past time to revise the rules of professional conduct so as to explicitly
accommodate transactional clients' interests in sharing information. Currently, the rules'
application to this context is largely unclear. 117 A conservative interpretation would
require law firms to obtain individual client waivers before referring to any of such clients'
transaction terms in negotiations on behalf of another client. Such a default prohibition on
information-sharing creates a free-rider problem, in which each client seeks to keep its own
information confidential by refusing to sign a waiver, yet still intends to benefit from the
firm's knowledge of other clients' information. At equilibrium no client will choose to
waive the confidentiality of its information, resulting in no information-sharing across
clients. Yet this outcome is not in clients' collective interest: as discussed, there is a positive
externality to firms' market information.
This leaves it to law firms to test the rules' boundaries under conditions of significant
uncertainty. As a result, firms' individual practices as to the use of clients' transaction
terms likely vary considerably, yet are unlikely to be fully disclosed to clients. In the
absence of a waiver, it is impossible to say whether clients have implicitly acquiesced to
the use of their information, or, more troublingly, are simply unaware of their firms'
practices. Recognizing the value of market-information sharing for clients in the aggregate,
the rules of professional conduct for lawyers could be revised in one of two ways. First,
they could state explicitly what practices are and are not permissible with respect to clients'
transaction terms. Alternatively, the current default rule of confidentiality could be
reversed, by explicitly allowing firms to share certain transaction information across clients
unless the client expressly opts out of such a regime. 1 18 If clients are willing to sacrifice
116. See generally Gilson, supra note 13 (describing the paradigm of relationship lawyering).
117. In addition to the general duty to keep client information confidential, the rules of professional conduct
also prohibit a law firm from using a client's information to that client's detriment. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.8(b) (ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPON. 2015) ("A lawyer shall not use information relating to
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent .... "). What
this general prohibition entails for firms representing various competitors or potential competitors in a
transactional context is less than clear. See, e.g., Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d
1277, 1282 (Pa. 1992) (finding that a law firm's representation of a client whose interests were materially adverse
to a former client represented in a substantially related matter constituted a breach of fiduciary duty). A law firm's
use in negotiations of one client's deal terms, even without attribution, in order to obtain a better economic deal
on another transaction for that client's competitor would, absent an express waiver, seem to fall within a sizable
gray area of the law.
118. While there is still the possibility of free-riding under such an opt-out regime, the overall effect should
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confidentiality for the benefit of current market knowledge, the relevant rules and
institutions should permit them to do so both efficiently and unambiguously.
VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding sluggish demand for law-firm services in the aggregate, elite law
firms in the United States continue to thrive and to dominate the market for the largest
corporate transactions. Existing accounts of the value provided by transactional lawyers do
not fully explain this state-of-play, because they omit a crucial function performed by
repeat-player law firms. Such firms aggregate private market information about deal terms
and use this information to identify value-increasing terms for their clients and to assist
with term pricing. Traditional accounts of financial contracting have failed to recognize the
rapidly expanding set of transaction terms and the difficulty of pricing them, due to
common misconceptions about the actual practice of transactional negotiations. To the
extent that elite law firms can improve their clients' outcomes in major transactions by
using market knowledge, they should remain largely immune from competition from in-
house counsel, the commoditization of legal work, and client pressure to decrease fees.
be greater information-sharing than under the current default rule if we accept the prediction from behavioral
economics that setting the default rule affects the parties' choices. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the
Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 106 (2002) (critiquing the view of conventional economic analysis that changes
to default rules should not have significant effects on behavior).
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